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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16840 
MICHAEL JOHNSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant-Appellant was found guilty of public 
intoxication under Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, 1965, §32-1-4, and appeals on the grounds that 
said ordinance is unconstitutionally vague on its face, 
and seeks a dismissal of the charge against him. 
II 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
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Lake County, State of Utah, entered a Minute Entry on 
December 10, 1979, and presented a final order on 
December 21, 1979, ruling against the Appellant on 
his appeal from the Fifth Circuit Court of Salt Lake 
County from the guilty judgment therein. 
III 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the order denying his 
Motion to Dismiss, a declaratory judgment that the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1965, §32-1-4 
is unconstitutionally vague on its face, and a 
dismissal of the criminal action against the Defendant 
herein. 
IV 
STATEMENT OF CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 23, 1978, the Defendant-Appellant, 
herein referred to as "appellant", was arrested in 
front of his home by the Salt Lake City Police De-
partment for the offense of public intoxication. On 
December 26, 1978, the Plaintiff-Respondent filed a 
criminal Complaint against the Appellant in the Court 
below alleging a violation of the Revised Ordinances 
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of Salt Lake City, 1965, §32-1-4. On January 9, 1979, 
the Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging 
that the ordinance under which Appellant was charged 
was and is unconstitutionally vague. The lower Court 
entered an Order denying the Appellant's Motion to 
Dismiss on May 3, 1979, and on May 3, 1979, the 
Appellant duly reserved his right to appeal the issue 
by filing a timely Notice of Preservation of Right to 
Appeal. On May 14, 1979, the Appellant was found 
guilty on the charge. The Appellant filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal on the denial of his Motion to 
Dismiss. On December 10, 1979, the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah entered a Minute Entry ruling against the 
Appellant on this appeal. Apparently, the Court did 
not have access to the Reply Memorandum and the Re-
quest for Oral Arguments in this matter prior to the 
Court's ruling on December 10, 1979. Upon request, 
the Third Judicial District Court allowed oral 
arguments on December 21, 1979. At the conclusion of 
the oral arguments, a final order was presented which 
affirmed the judgment of the lower court. 
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v 
ARGUMENT 
§32-1-4 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE 
CITY, 1965, IS IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION IN THAT IT IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONALLY VAGUE ON ITS FACE 
The crime of which the Defendant was charged in 
the above captioned matter was the crime of violating 
§32-1-4 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
1965, hereinafter referred to as "the ordinance." 
The ordinance provides as follows: 
"No person shall drink liquor in a public 
building, park or stadium or be in an 
intoxicated condition in a public place." 
The Defendant concedes the constitutionality of 
the first part of the ordinance which provides that 
"no person shall drink liquor in a public building, 
park or stadium ... ," as being a permissible exercise 
of the police power and as being sufficiently clear 
so as to afford notice of what acts constitute a 
violation of the ordinance sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of due process set forth in the United 
States Constitution. 
The second part of the ordinance, which provides 
that"[no person shall] be in an intoxicated condition 
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in a public place",is in violation of the United States 
Constitution in that it is vague on its face and 
therefore denies due process to those accused of or 
found guilty of its violation. 
It is a cardinal rule of constitutional law that 
all statutes and ordinances must meet a certain 
criteria of clarity before they may be enforced. The 
United States Supreme Court has reasoned that an 
arrest or conviction under a statute which does not 
afford the accused adequate notice of what acts do 
and do not constitute a violation of that statute is a 
denial of due process. Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110, 92 S. 
Ct. 839 (1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 
83 L. Ed. 888, 59 S. Ct. 618 (1939); Connally v. 
General Construction Co. 269 U.S. 385, 70 L. Ed. 322, 
46 S. Ct. 126 (1926). The Court in Lanzetta noted for 
example: 
. . No one may be required at peril of 
life, liberty or property to speculate as 
to the meaning of penal statutes. All are 
entitled to be informed as to what the 
State commands or forbids. The applicable 
rule is stated in Connally v. General 
Construction Co. "That the terms of a 
penal statute creating a new offense must 
be sufficiently explicit to inform those 
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who are subject to it what conduct on their 
part will render them liable to i.ts 
penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, 
consonant alike with ordinary notions of 
fair play and the settled rules of law. 
And a statute ·which either forbids or 
requires the doing of an act in terms so 
vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application, violates 
the first essential of due process of law." 
(footnotes ommitted) 
In the instant case, the Defendant was charged 
with being in an intoxicated condition in a public 
place. Black's ·Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 
defines the word "intoxicated" as "affected by an 
intoxicant, under the influence of an intoxicating 
liquor." The citation in Black's Law Dictionary 
for that definition is Taylor v. Joyce, 4 Cal. Ap. 
No. 2 page 612, 41 P. 2d 967, 968 (1935). 
In defining "intoxication", the Courts have 
attempted to provide the meaning of that term. In 
doing so, cases hold that the term "intoxication" is 
commonly understood by "a person of ordinary intell-
igence". However, when the Court in each of these 
cases defines the term "intoxication", several 
significantly different interpretations arise, both 
between themselves and with the definition of the 
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term established in Black's Law Dictionary. See, 
Findlay v. Tulsa, Okl. Cir., 561 P. 2d 980 (1977); 
Quittner v. Thompson, 309 F. Supp. 684 (1970); 
Clowney v. State, Fla. 102 So. 2d 619 (1958); 
McArthur v. State, Fla. 191 So. 2d 429 (1966); and 
State V. Painter, 134 S. E. 2d 638 (1964). 
The mere consumption of a small amount of liquor 
may cause a person "to be affected by the intoxicant." 
And this is true no matter how minimal the effect or 
the influence. 
The determination of what constitutes "public 
intoxication" is a determination of degrees. Clearly, 
only in extraordinary cases, would a person that has 
consumed one beer be arrested for public intoxication, 
and clearly only in extraordinary cases, would a 
person that has consumed a fifth of whiskey not be 
arrested for public intoxication. The problem area 
is between the one beer consumer and the one fifth 
consumer. Who makes the determination as to which 
persons are arrested from this category? The police 
officer on the street, and what criteria does he use? 
His own "common knowledge" of what a drunk is and 
does, without any clear objective standards from the 
statute. 
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The Utah State Legislature has, by establishing a 
plan for the distribution of alcohol to adults in the 
State of Utah, indicated an intent that consumption of 
alcohol in Utah by adults under certain conditions 
shall be a lawful activity. The conduct proscribed 
by the ordinance of appearing in public after con-
sumption of a minimal amount of alcohol should not be 
deemed a criminal offense. 
The ordinance provides no notice to citizens of 
Salt Lake City of what conduct is declared illegal. 
Given the above-described policy of the Utah legis-
lature, that adults may drink alcoholic beverages 
within the state, a citizen might assume that it is 
legal to appear in public after consuming a small 
amount of alcoholic intoxicant. Given the ordinance, 
a citizen might assume that at some level of intoxication 
or at some level of disorderly or dangerous conduct, 
one who is intoxicated in public has violated the 
ordinance. But the ordinance does not make clear 
that some minimal level of intoxication is permissi_hle 
in public in Salt Lake City, and does not give any 
indication of what level of intoxication or standard 
of conduct is a violation of the ordinance. 
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The ordinance leaves too much discretion to 
arresting officers to determine what level of intox-
ication or what quality or conduct renders a person 
in violation of the ordinance. That is an extra-
ordinary subjective evaluation of another human being-
with plenty of room for error. Even if one comes in 
contact with another person who, for example, lacks 
a continuity of thought or of ideas, the ability of 
one person to know simply on that basis-without any 
other objective evaluation-that the other person acts 
in that manner totally because his brain is so far 
affected by potations of intoxicating liquor, is 
simply beyond the realm of ordinary, realistic 
human capability. This discretion leaves the door 
open for harassment by police officers of members of 
certain groups who are otherwise not engaging in any 
conduct which is either illegal or a danger to them-
selves or to others. The United States Supreme Court 
noted this danger inherent in vague statutes in the 
Papachristou case, supra. 
Those generally implicated by the imprecise 
terms of the ordinance--poor people, 
nonconformists, dissenters, idlers--may 
be required to comport themselves according 
to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the 
Jacksonville police and the courts. Where, 
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as here, there are not standards governing 
the exercise of the discretion granted by 
the ordinance, the scheme permits and 
encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement by local prosecuting officials, 
against particular groups deemed to merit 
their displeasure. Thornhill v. Alabama. 
310 U.S. 88, 97-98, 84 L. Ed. 1093, 1100, 
60 S. Ct. 736. It results in a regime in 
which the poor and the unpopular are permitted 
to "stand on a public sidewalk ... only at the 
whim of any police officer." (L. Ed. at 
page 120) 
There are several methods Salt Lake City might 
use to proscribe public intoxication which would pass 
constitutional muster. The Utah State Legislature 
has set an example with its statutes prohibiting 
intoxication while operating a motor vehicle. The 
Legislature has provided that when the blood alcohol 
level of a driver reaches a certain point, the driver 
is conclusively presumed to be intoxicated and 
incapable of operating a motor vehicle. U.C.A., 
1953, §41-6-44. Such an objective standard of 
intoxication puts all citizens and law enforcement 
officers of Utah on notice of exactly what conduct 
(consuming a certain, ascertainable amount of alcohol) 
will be a violation of Utah Law. 
It might also be appropriate for the ordinance 
to provide that it is illegal to be in an intoxicated 
condition in public such that one is a danger t~ him-
self or a danger to others,or such that his conduct 
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constitutes disorderly conduct. For example, the 
California Penal Code §647 (£) provides: 
Every person who conrrnits any of the following 
acts shall be guilty of disorderly conduct, a 
misdemeanor: 
*** 
(f) Who is found in any public place under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, or any drug, 
... or under the influence of any combination 
of any intoxicating liquor, drug, toluene or 
any such poison, in such a condition that he 
is unable to exercise care for his safiet or 
t e sa ety o ot ers, or by reason o his 
being under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor, or any drug, ... or under the 
influence of any combination of any intoxicating 
liquor, drug, toluene or any such poison, 
interferes with or obstructs or revents the 
an street, si ewa 
Such an ordinance would put citizens, police, and 
prosecutors on notice of what conduct is unlawful 
which the present ordinance does not do. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The criminal ordinance in dispute is a violation 
of the United States Constitution. It denies due 
process to persons arrested and/or convicted under the 
ordinance, for reason that the ordinance is vague on 
its face. Constitutional means exist by which Salt 
Lake City might remedy the evil it has sought to 
remedy by enacting the ordinance. 
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The Court should declare that the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City, 1965, §32-1-4 is unconstitutionally 
vague on its face, and is therefore void and 
unenforceable and should dismiss the charges against 
the Defendant herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/;-"? 
-·-·?"'~· 
/·</"' 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
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